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Whereas the long-running Military Revolution debate has focused primarily on 
changes in military technology and the growth of states in early modern Europe, the 
example of King Frederick II (“the Great”) of Prussia highlights how changes in the 
character of war were perceived by contemporaries, and how they used narratives of 
change for rhetorical purposes. Frederick and his contemporaries saw their own time 
as more intellectually advanced than any previous age, and this narrative of 
intellectual progress existed alongside a narrative of states bringing order. Frederick 
articulated largely consistent ideas about military history, but also used concepts of 
the superiority of “our age” to extoll the virtues of his own oblique order of battle, and 
manipulated narratives of technological change to apologise for his own mistakes. 
Frederick also turned to an idealised classical world – particularly Julius Caesar – to 
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The long-running Military Revolution debate has focused much scholarly attention on 
changes in the character of war in early modern Europe, particularly developments in 
military technology and the tactics this fostered, and in the capacity of states to wage 
war.1 This article, however, uses the example of King Frederick II (“the Great”) of 
Prussia (reigned 1740-86) to highlight the importance of considering not just actual 
but perceived change (or lack of change) in the character of war, and the ways in 
which change is presented for rhetorical purposes.2 It examines not only Frederick’s 
own writings but also those of authors read by him – particularly military 
commentators such as the marquis de Feuquières (1648-1711), the chevalier de Folard 
(1669-1752), the marquis de Puységur (1656-1743), the marquis de Quincy (1660-
1728), the marquis de Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684-1732) and Maurice de Saxe 
(1696-1750) – as well as the works of Frederick’s military intimate Karl Theophil 
Guichard (1724-75) and of Friedrich Moritz von Rohr, an ensign in Frederick’s 
guard.3 It shows that Frederick and many of his contemporaries saw their own time as 
distinct from previous ages, both because of intellectual developments associated 
particularly with what is now called the “Scientific Revolution” and because of efforts 
by states to impose order after the disasters of religious and civil wars. They also 
                                                
1 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 
1500-1800, 2nd edn. with further revision (Cambridge, 2001); Michael Roberts, The Military 
Revolution, 1560-1660: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the Queen’s University of 
Belfast (Belfast, 1956). For contrary views, see Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? 
Military Change and European Society 1550-1800 (London, 1991); Jeremy Black, 
“Eighteenth-Century Warfare Reconsidered”, War in History 1 (1994): 215-32; Andrew N. 
Liaropoulos, “Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The 
Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs”, The Journal of Military 
History 70 (2006): 363-84; David Parrott, “Had a Distinct Template for a ‘Western Way of 
War’ been Established before 1800?”, in The Changing Character of War, eds. Hew Strachan 
and Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford, 2011), 48-60. 
2 On “conceptual ‘fabrications’ of change and continuity”, see Hew Strachan and Sibylle 
Scheipers, “Introduction”, in The Changing Character of War, eds. Strachan and Scheipers, 
14, 16-20. 
3 On Frederick’s favourite military authors, see Großer Generalstab Kriegsgeschichtliche 
Abteilung II, Friedrich des Großen Anschauungen vom Kriege in ihrer Entwickelung von 
1745 bis 1756 (Berlin, 1899), 233-5, 377-9; Ullrich Marwitz, “Friedrich der Große als 
Feldherr”, in Friedrich der Große und das Militärwesen seiner Zeit, ed. 
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Herford, Bonn, 1987), 75. On Rohr, see Christopher 
Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great, 2nd edn. (Chicago, IL, 1996), 53. 
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recognized substantial differences in military technology between their own time and 
previous ages. However, they disagreed just as much as modern historians do about 
the nature and timing of these changes and the degree to which they had invalidated 
the lessons of classical antiquity. Indeed, the sense of living in a distinctly different 
age made an idealised classical past a seductive alternative to the limitations of the 
present. Moreover, Frederick and other military authors were perfectly prepared to 
manipulate their accounts of military history, and the associated changes in the 
character of war, in order to suit their rhetorical purposes. 
Recent years have seen a transformation in our understanding of Frederick II. 
Whereas historians like Friedrich Meinecke and Theodor Schieder portrayed 
Frederick as a contradictory figure, torn between his intellectual interests and the 
demands of power politics, Thomas Biskup, Jürgen Luh and Andreas Pečar have 
shown that the king’s military, literary and cultural achievements were all part of a 
consistent effort by Frederick to establish his own greatness.4 Avi Lifschtiz has 
emphasized that Frederick’s writings presented a consistent political philosophy that 
reflected broader contemporary trends, but noted that Frederick’s ideas were “far 
from . . . self-denying” and could even be seen as “self-seeking”.5 This article shows 
that Frederick similarly articulated relatively consistent ideas about military history 
and his own place within it, but that his accounts were also deeply self-serving and 
could be opportunistic and even contradictory, as the king manipulated contemporary 
ideas of change in military affairs and altered his account of military history in order 
to represent himself to best advantage. 
Christopher Clark argued that Frederick II had a “timeless” view of history, 
and that he was particularly attracted to the “distant past” of classical antiquity, but 
the example of military history shows that Frederick also followed contemporary 
                                                
4 Thomas Biskup, Friedrichs Größe. Inszenierung des Preußenkönigs in Fest und 
Zeremoniell 1740-1815 (Frankfurt am Main, New York, 2012); Jürgen Luh, Der Große. 
Friedrich II. von Preussen (Munich, 2011); Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The 
Doctrine of Raison d’Etat and its Place in Modern History, trans. Douglas Scott (London, 
1957), 274-339; Andreas Pečar, Die Masken des Königs. Friedrich II. von Preußen als 
Schriftsteller (Frankfurt am Main, New York, 2016); Theodor Schieder, Friedrich der Groβe. 
Ein Königtum der Widersprüche (Frankfurt am Main, 1983). 
5 Avi Lifschitz, “Introduction”, in Frederick the Great’s Philosophical Writings, ed. Avi 
Lifschitz, trans. Angela Scholar (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, 2021), vii-xlii (quotations, xviii, 
xlii); Avi Lifschitz, “Philosophy and Political Agency in the Writings of Frederick II of 
Prussia”, The Historical Journal 64 (2021): 533-56 (quotations: 538, 556). 
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ideas that sharply differentiated his own time from all previous ages.6 There was 
widespread belief that the early to mid-17th century had seen the inauguration of a 
new, more enlightened age, associated particularly with Francis Bacon, René 
Descartes and the “new philosophy” (the so-called “Scientific Revolution”). While 
many intellectuals portrayed “our age” (“nostre siècle”: the French word “siècle” 
could be translated either as a “century” or as an “age”) as building on the previous 
great civilizations of ancient Greece, Rome and the Renaissance, the “Quarrel of the 
Ancients and Moderns” in late 17th-century France saw the “moderns” argue that “our 
age” – specifically the age of King Louis XIV of France (reigned 1643-1715) – was 
more advanced than any that had gone before, and Frederick used such arguments to 
present his own military ideas to best advantage.7 
Reinhard Koselleck argued that many Europeans in the long 18th century (the 
period roughly from the mid 17th century until the French Revolution) saw their own 
time as distinct from past ages but without any notion of “progress” toward the 
future.8 Frederick’s portrayal of military history is a reminder that many European 
monarchs of the period in fact drew on powerful narratives of progress, although 
figures like Frederick and Louis XIV portrayed themselves as the culmination of this 
progress – a veritable “end of history” – rather than claiming to pave the way for 
future developments.9 Crucially, the narrative of intellectual progress existed 
alongside a separate but related narrative of order, with states presenting themselves 
as ending the chaos of religious and civil war.10 
Frederick also offers important perspectives on the place of the classics within 
European military thought. Azar Gat and Armstrong Starkey have noted that the 18th 
                                                
6 Christopher Clark, Time and Power: Visions of History in German Politics, from the Thirty 
Years' War to the Third Reich (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, 2019), 2, 15-16, 72-117, 211-4, 
216 (quotations, 99, 103, 106, 111-113). 
7 Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago, IL, and London, 2010) 
(quotation, 40); Nicole Ferrier-Caverivière, L’image de Louis XIV dans la littérature 
française de 1660 à 1715 (Paris, 1981), 354-6, 360, 365-9; Larry F. Norman, The Shock of the 
Ancient: Literature & History in Early Modern France (Chicago, IL, and London, 2011); 
Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, Paperback edn. (Chicago, IL, and London, 1998), 3, 
5; Voltaire, Le siècle de Louis XIV, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1751), Vol. I, 1-5. On the meaning of 
“siècle”, see Joan DeJean, Ancients Against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin 
de Siècle (Chicago, IL, and London, 1997), 2, 18-23, 151-2. 
8 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe 
(Cambridge, MA, and London, 1985), 3-20 (quotation, 17). 
9 On this phenomenon in the case of Louis XIV, see DeJean, Ancients against Moderns, ix-x, 
16-17, 19-20, 79; Ferrier-Caverivière, L’image de Louis XIV, 371-3. 
10 On this phenomenon, see Edelstein, The Enlightenment, 35; Norman, Shock of the Ancient, 
11. 
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century saw differing views about the relevance of ancient examples for 
contemporary warfare, and this article shows that Frederick’s approach to classical 
military history in some cases simply reflected his rhetorical needs in a particular 
situation.11 Larry Norman has noted that many Europeans in the 17th and 18th 
centuries saw the classical past as “a fundamentally foreign world”, but that it was 
precisely “the remoteness of antiquity” that could make classical examples attractive. 
“Ancient works”, Norman noted, were “alien enough to provide alternative models, 
and yet relevant enough to provide at least partially accessible models”.12 Historians 
have noted that Johann Joachim Winckelmann, who inspired philhellenism in 
Germany in the later 18th century, created an “ancient Greece of the German 
imagination [that] existed neither as Athens, nor Sparta, nor any other historical city-
state, but rather as a sort of composite dream-world”.13 In the same way, Frederick – 
while situating his battle tactics within “our age” – looked on the strategic level to an 
idealised version of the ancient world as a means to achieve conquests that were 
scarcely possible in his own time. 
 
 
2. An Age of Order 
 
Frederick portrayed his age as defined by the destruction of the European religious 
and civil wars, notably the Thirty Years War (1618-48). While Frederick’s Memoir to 
Serve as the History of the House of Brandenburg started with the earliest 
Brandenburg rulers, Frederick wrote that Hohenzollern history was only of interest 
from the reign of Elector John Sigismund (1608-1619), who had added Cleves and 
East Prussia to the Hohenzollern dominions. Dismissing the reigns of electors 
Frederick I (reigned 1415-40) and Albert Achilles (reigned 1471-86), Frederick 
argued that, “the Thirty Years War is much more interesting”.14 In 1718, Frederick’s 
                                                
11 Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford, 
1989), 7-8; Armstrong Starkey, War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700-1789 (Westport, CT, 
London, 2003), 8-9, 22, 34-8, 51, 56, 60, 211. For the comparable situation during the 
Renaissance, see Parker. The Military Revolution, 6. 
12 Norman, Shock of the Ancient, (quotations, 5, 14, 16-17). 
13 Helen Roche, “The Peculiarities of German Philhellenism”, The Historical Journal 61 
(2018): 545. 
14 Johann D. E. Preuss, ed. Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand, 30 vols. (Berlin, 1846-56) 
[henceforth Œuvres], Vol. I, L. 
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father, King Frederick William I (reigned 1713-40) instructed Frederick’s tutor only 
to teach him in detail the history of the past 150 years, and in 1717 he had given 
similar instructions for the education of the orphaned son of Major General von Albe, 
saying that the boy should learn the history of the past hundred years (i.e. since the 
outbreak of the Thirty Years War).15 Frederick’s own 1751 instructions for the 
education of the future King Frederick William II laid down that the prince was to 
learn ancient history, and modern history from Charlemagne onwards, but told his 
tutor Major Borcke to “go into greater detail only at the Thirty Years War”.16 
Feuquières, Frederick’s favourite military author, similarly began his survey of 
European power politics in the year 1666, and refused to discuss the French Wars of 
Religion (1562-98) or the noble revolt of the Fronde (1648-53), although he did cite 
the English Civil Wars (1642-51).17 
Even in 1945, many Germans still considered the Thirty Years War the most 
devastating conflict in their history. At least 15 per cent (and perhaps fully a third) of 
the population of the German lands died during the war, with the population only 
recovering to pre-1618 levels in the 1710s. Among the Hohenzollern territories, the 
population of Pomerania fell by 40%, while the urban population of Brandenburg 
declined from 113,500 to 34,000, the rural population from 300,000 to 75,000.18 As 
Frederick described it, “all the scourges of the universe fell at the same time on this 
unfortunate electorate [Brandenburg]”.19 
Frederick’s emphasis on this conflict was not surprising, for the religious and 
civil wars provided an important justification for the stronger, more centralized 
government that was slowly introduced in many European states during the 17th 
century, as rulers and states promised to ensure order to prevent such catastrophes 
happening again.20 Frederick’s favourite book, Voltaire’s Henriade, described how 
                                                
15 Friedrich Cramer, ed., Zur Geschichte Friedrich Wilhelms I. und Friedrichs II. Könige von 
Preußen, 3rd edn. (Leipzig, 1835), 14; Friedrich-Karl Tharau, Die geistige Kultur des 
preußischen Offiziers von 1640 bis 1806 (Mainz, 1968), 66, 73-4. 
16 Œuvres, Vol. IX, 41-2. 
17 Antoine de Pas, marquis de Feuquières, Mémoires, new edn. (London, 1736), 11-12, 123. 
On Frederick’s preference for Feuquiéres, see Max Jähns, Geschichte der 
Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland, 3 vols. (Munich and Leipzig, 1889-91), 
Vol. II, 1469-73. 
18 Peter H. Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War (London, 2009), 4-
6, 787-95. 
19 Oeuvres, Vol. I, 36. 
20 Peter H. Wilson, Absolutism in Central Europe (London and New York, 2000), 11-12, 15-
16, 18, 35, 52-3, 60; Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 807-11. 
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France was devastated by the “Discord” of the Wars of Religion, and portrayed the 
conflict particularly as a threat to legitimate authority.21 Frederick noted that Louis 
XIV had lived through the Fronde in his youth just as Frederick William the Great 
Elector (reigned 1640-88) saw the devastation of Brandenburg in the Thirty Years 
War, and he described both rulers as working to re-establish royal authority within 
their domains.22 
Across Europe, ideas of state intervention to ensure a well-ordered society 
were expressed through the concept of “police” (“Policey” in contemporary 
German).23 Frederick wrote of “the infinite distance . . . between a policed people and 
a barbarous people”, thus presenting order as an important element in civilization.24 
Such ideas not only distinguished Europe from other parts of the world – Frederick 
emphasized the difference between “a savage of Canada” and “some citizen of a 
policed country of Europe” – but also designated some parts of Europe as “policed” 
and others as not. After visiting the Polish territory he had acquired through the First 
Partition of Poland (1772), Frederick declared that he had gone there in order “to 
reform barbarous laws . . . and to establish some police in a country where the name 
itself was unknown”.25 Contemptuously describing the inhabitants of the Habsburg 
domains of Bohemia and Moravia as “half savage”, Frederick in contrast celebrated 
his own province of Silesia as “a policed country” (“un pays policé”).26 
The memory of the religious and civil wars was also an important justification 
for the standing armies that developed in the second half of the 17th century. The 
                                                
21 Arnold Berney, Friedrich der Grosse. Entwicklungsgeschichte eines Staatsmannes 
(Tübingen, 1934), 61; Peter Gay, Voltaire’s Politics: The Poet as Realist (Princeton, NJ, 
1959), 42, 98-9; Œuvres, Vol. VIII, 59-61; Œuvres, Vol. XXI, 10; Voltaire, La Henriade, 
new edn. (London, 1730). On the Henriade as Frederick’s favourite book see, Adam L. 
Storring, Frederick the Great and the Meanings of War, 1730-1755, Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation (Faculty of History, University of Cambridge, 2017, 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/277782), 87. 
22 Œuvres, Vol. I, 107. 
23 Karl Härter, ed., Policey und frühneuzeitliche Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 2000); 
Alexandre Mendes Cunha, “A Previously Unnoticed Swiss Connection in the Dissemination 
of Cameralist Ideas during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century”, History of Political 
Economy 49 (2017): 497-529; Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and 
Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800 (New Haven, 
CT, and London, 1983); Keith Tribe, Governing Economy: The Reformation of German 
Economic Discourse, 1750-1840 (Cambridge, 1988), 28-34. 
24 Œuvres, Vol. IX, 197. See also Œuvres, Vol. VIII, 100, 227; Œuvres, Vol. XX, 323. 
25 Quotations Œuvres, Vol. IX, 199; Œuvres, Vol. XXIII, 293. See also Œuvres, Vol. II, 37; 
Œuvres, Vol. IX, 144; Œuvres, Vol. XIII, 51; Œuvres, Vol. XXIII, 114, 314; Œuvres, Vol. 
XXVI, 407. 
26 Œuvres, Vol. XXVI, 526.  
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Great Elector for instance used the experience of the Thirty Years War to argue for 
the “necessity” of maintaining a permanent standing army.27 In 1770, responding to 
Baron d'Holbach’s Essay on Prejudices, Frederick maintained that it was because 
“France maintains great armies” that “she is no longer exposed to those times of 
confusion and unrest when she tore herself apart through civil wars”.28 
The religious and civil wars had been particularly notable for depredations by 
soldiers against civilians, and states and rulers of the long 18th century promised to 
end this through ordered and disciplined armies.29 In his 1740 Refutation of the Prince 
of Machiavelli, Frederick emphasized the difference between the armies of his own 
time, contained by “discipline and good order”, and the “mass of bandits” of the era 
of Machiavelli, “who usually lived only on violence and rapine”.30 In his 1770 
Examination of the Essay on Prejudices, Frederick extolled the standing armies of his 
own day as greatly preferable to “the ancient usage of hastily arming the peasants 
when a neighbour appeared threatening, of maintaining this militia by rapine and 
brigandage without assigning it regular pay, and dismissing it at the [conclusion of] 
peace”.31 
The dating of this age of order remained flexible, however. In his 1780 treatise 
On German Literature, the Faults for Which One Can Reproach it, What are the 
Causes, and by What Means One Can Correct Them, Frederick wrote that not only 
had the Wars of Religion and Thirty Years War held back the development of the arts 
in France and Germany respectively but the Holy Roman Empire’s succeeding wars 
against France and the Ottomans had continued to hinder its cultural development. “It 
was therefore only after the War of [the Spanish] Succession [1701-14] that we began 
to repair what so many successive calamities had caused us to lose.”32 While the early 
18th century had indeed seen a blossoming of princely palace-building and patronage 
of the arts in Germany, this had already begun in the late 17th century, as Frederick 
well knew from the example of his own grandfather King Frederick I (reigned 1688-
1713) and his wife Queen Sophia Charlotte (1668-1705).33 By manipulating the 
                                                
27 Clark, Time and Power, 2, 15, 19-71, 211-2, 214, 216, 224-5. 
28 Œuvres, Vol. IX, 169. 
29 Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 789-92, 808. 
30 Œuvres, Vol. VIII, 78, 197-8. 
31 Œuvres, Vol. IX, 173. 
32 Œuvres, Vol. VII, 109-11 (quotation, 110). 
33 Rolf Toman, ed., Baroque: Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, trans. Paul Aston, Phil 
Greenhead, Christine Shuttleworth (Königswinter, 2004), 184, 196-9. 
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chronology, Frederick wrote his grandfather out of the narrative, thus emphasizing his 
own role in sponsoring cultural development in Germany.34 
Gerhard Oestreich noted that this search for order substantially drew on 
ancient examples, and indeed numerous authors read by Frederick honoured Roman 
military discipline as the fore-runner of their age’s disciplined armies.35 Frederick’s 
intimate Guichard described the Romans as one of “the policed nations” (“nations 
policées”), and the king himself described ancient Greece as “the first policed country 
in the world”.36 In the opening paragraph of his 1748 General Principles of War, 
Frederick echoed Publius Vegetius Renatus – the classic source on ancient methods of 
military organisation – as he maintained that, “the Roman discipline lives on only 
with us”.37 In his 1755 Thoughts and General Rules for War, Frederick again 
compared the Prussian soldiers to Roman legionaries, as they were “formed and 
trained for battles” whereas the Austrians were superior in irregular troops.38 In 1758, 
Frederick similarly began his Reflections on Tactics and on Certain Parts of War, or 
Reflections on Certain Changes in the Manner of Making War with a reference to one 
of the maxims of Vegetius.39 Frederick and his contemporaries thus saw their ordered 
age and way of warfare as a return to classical and especially Roman precedents. 
 
                                                
34 On Frederick II’s portrayal of Frederick I, see Andreas Pečar, “Selbstinszenierung auf 
Kosten der Dynastie? Friedrich II. als Autor der “Denkwürdigkeiten des Hauses 
Brandenburg””, in Friedrich der Große und die Dynastie der Hohenzollern: Beiträge des 
fünften Colloquiums in der Reihe „Friedrich300“ vom 30. September / 1. Oktober 2011, eds. 
Michael Kaiser and Jürgen Luh 
(http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/friedrich300-colloquien/friedrich-
dynastie/pecar_geschichtsschreibung, last accessed 17 June 2021), paragraphs 22-5. 
35 Raimondo Montecuccoli, Mémoires, new edn. (Paris, 1746), pp. 8-10, 21; Charles-Louis de 
Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains 
et de leur décadence, 2nd edn. (Amsterdam, 1735), 17-19; Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism 
and the Early Modern State, eds. Brigitta Oestreich and H. G. Koenigsberger, trans. David 
McLintock (Cambridge etc., 1982), passim (esp. 4-9); Gerhard Oestreich, Antiker Geist und 
moderner Staat bei Justus Lipsius (1547-1606). Der Neustoizismus als politische Bewegung, 
ed. Nicolette Mout (Göttingen, 1989), 39-41; Marquis de Santa Cruz de Marcenado, 
Réflexions militaires et politiques, trans. de Vergy, 4 vols. (The Hague, 1739), Vol. I, 237, 
309, 314, 319; René Aubert de Vertot, Histoire des révolutions arrivées dans le 
gouvernement de la République romaine, 3rd edn., 3 vols. (The Hague, 1724), Vol. II, 295, 
301. 
36 Karl Theophil Guichard, Mémoires critiques et historiques sur plusieurs points d’antiquités 
militaires, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1774), Vol. I, xii; Œuvres, Vol. XXIV, 327. 
37 Œuvres, Vol. XXVIII, 3. See also Œuvres, Vol. I, 223; Œuvres, Vol. VI, 105; Œuvres, 
Vol. XXVIII, 100. 
38 Œuvres, Vol. XXVIII, 142. 
39 Œuvres, Vol. XXVIII, 169. See Frederick’s reference to the same maxim in Gustav 
Berthold Volz, ed., Die politischen Testamente Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1920), 81. 
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3. “Our Age” 
 
In his 1753 introduction to an Extract of the work of the chevalier de Folard, which he 
commissioned for his officers, Frederick declared that: 
 
The art of war . . . still lacks classic books. We have few. Caesar, in his 
Commentaries, teaches us little more than what we see in the war of 
pandours [Croatian irregulars]; his expedition to Great Britain is nothing 
else. A general nowadays could only make use of the disposition of his 
cavalry on the day of Pharsalus. There is nothing to profit from all the 
wars that were fought in the time of the later [Roman] empire. We see the 
military art reborn during the troubles in Flanders [the Dutch Revolt 
(1566-1648)], and Turenne, a pupil of Prince Maurice of Orange [1567-
1625], learned there this art that had been neglected for so many 
centuries.40  
 
In his 1748 General Principles of War, Frederick had similarly declared that: 
 
The ruses the ancients used in war have become the domain of light 
troops. Some make ambushes; some attract their enemies by a simulated 
flight into defiles to cut them to pieces. Modern generals are hardly 
ignorant enough to fall into these kinds of crude ambushes.41 
 
Indeed, Frederick’s writings had very little to say about ancient battle tactics. He often 
mentioned the battle of Thermopylae (480 BC), focusing particularly on the strategic 
importance of the mountain pass defended by the Greeks and on the courage of King 
Leonidas and his Spartans.42 The Prussian king, however, said little about the other 
battles of the Greco-Persian Wars, and did not describe the tactics used in any of the 
                                                
40 Extrait tiré des Commentaires du chevalier Folard sur l’Histoire de Polybe, pour l’usage 
d’un officier (Berlin, 1753), 3-4. 
41 Œuvres, Vol. XXVIII, 50. 
42 Œuvres, Vol. III, 78-9; Œuvres, Vol. V, 54, 254-5; Œuvres, Vol. VIII, 22-3, 111, 242; 
Œuvres, Vol. X, 154, 276; Œuvres, Vol. XI, 99. 
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battles of Alexander the Great, Hannibal or Scipio Africanus.43 This was despite the 
fact that these battles potentially offered numerous lessons for Frederick’s own 
tactics. Alexander, Hannibal and Scipio all used outflanking manoeuvres, as Frederick 
did, and the former two used cavalry to deal decisive blows just as the Prussian army 
did in the Seven Years War (1756-63) in particular.44 The most striking omission was 
of the Theban general Epaminondas (418-362 BC) and his victory over the Spartans 
at Leuctra in 371 BC, won using precisely the oblique line tactic that Frederick came 
to favour, with the attack concentrated against just part of the enemy line.45 Apart 
from one reference to the unusually deep column formation employed by the 
Thebans, Frederick scarcely referred to Leuctra at all, and certainly not to support his 
own tactical ideas.46 
This silence on the tactics of ancient battles certainly did not reflect a lack of 
knowledge on Frederick’s part. Alongside his wide reading of actual classical authors, 
he also particularly liked the ancient histories of Charles Rollin (1661-1741), and the 
works of René-Aubert Vertot (1655-1735) and Montesquieu on Roman history.47 
                                                
43 For Frederick’s (brief) references to the battles of Marathon (490 BC), Salamis (480 BC), 
Plataea (479 BC), Granicus (334 BC), Gaugamela (331 BC), Cannae (216 BC) and Zama 
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Rollin for instance described Alexander’s battles in detail, and Frederick is known to 
have read the Greek historian Polybius, the most important chronicler of the 
campaigns of Hannibal and Scipio.48 Frederick quoted anecdotes from Alexander’s 
campaigns, described Hannibal’s skilful manoeuvres when crossing the river Rhône 
in 218 BC, noted Archimedes’ efforts to foil the Roman siege of Syracuse in 213-212 
BC, and discussed Hannibal’s use of the Italian town of Capua as a base during the 
Second Punic War (218-201 BC).49 In 1736, the Saxon diplomat Ernst Christoph von 
Manteuffel told Frederick in detail about the Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus 
(c.280-203 BC), and Frederick clearly understood Fabius’s famous tactics of avoiding 
battle against Hannibal because he used the comparison to mock his opponent 
Leopold von Daun during the Seven Years War.50 
The idea that the ancient art of war had been rediscovered in the age of 
Maurice of Orange – a “military renaissance”, as Robert Quimby called it – was a 
commonplace at the time and indeed since.51 Puységur indeed argued that the military 
theory of his own day had still not equalled that of the classical period, and presented 
his own work as finally achieving this.52 
In almost completely neglecting classical battle tactics, however, Frederick 
was seeking not to equal the ancients but to surpass them. In his writings, the Prussian 
king followed the idea of successive great ages of civilization, praising the importance 
given to the sciences in “our enlightened age” (“notre siècle éclairé”), differentiating 
the modern approach to the sciences from that of the ancients, and noting Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz and Isaac Newton among the great men of “our age” (“notre 
siècle”).53 Frederick’s neglect of ancient battle tactics reflected the claims of 
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“moderns” that “our age” was more advanced than any that had gone before. 
Johannes Kunisch noted that Frederick’s words reflected “the self-satisfied certainty 
that his age, so proud of its intellect, had been the first successfully to produce an art 
of war bounded by reason”.54 In 1774, Frederick’s intimate Guichard argued that the 
military Renaissance was out-dated, noting that “there was an epoch when in effect 
the ancients were our sole masters in the art of war”, but arguing that this had only 
been necessary to escape “the ignorance of barbarous centuries”.55 Rohr referred to 
the “changes which have gradually taken place, until the art of war has reached the 
perfection (“Vollkommenheit”) in which it now finds itself”.56 
Frederick was hugely influenced by Voltaire’s book The Age of Louis XIV, 
which described the cultural flowering in France under the reign of the Sun King. 
Frederick’s programme of cultural patronage throughout his reign aimed to create his 
own “age of Louis XIV” (or “age of Frederick”), and this also had a military 
dimension, reflecting France’s status as the greatest military power of the long 18th 
century. In contrast to his scanty mentions of classical battle tactics, Frederick’s 
writings were full of discussion of battles of the age of Louis XIV. Whereas Frederick 
said nothing about Epaminondas’s oblique line tactic at Leuctra, he repeatedly 
mentioned the outflanking manoeuvre of Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de 
Turenne (1611-75) at the 1675 battle of Turckheim, and described in detail the victory 
of François-Henri de Montmorency, duc de Luxembourg (1628-95), again using an 
outflanking manoeuvre, at the 1690 battle of Fleurus. While Frederick’s Extract of the 
work of Folard removed most of the original work’s discussion of Polybius, over half 
of its pages were dedicated to a description of the 1705 battle of Cassano in the War 
of the Spanish Succession, and Frederick’s introduction to the work specifically 
praised Turenne. Frederick’s neglect of classical tactics thus reflected his fundamental 
focus on “the age of Louis XIV”, and his desire to associate his own military 
achievements with those of the most famous French generals.57 
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Whilst Frederick’s contemporaries genuinely celebrated the achievements of 
their own age, particularly in natural philosophy, the claims of “moderns” could also 
be self-serving, and the Prussian king was no exception.58 The Dutch military reforms 
had centred on the re-introduction of ancient military drill, and it was therefore absurd 
for Frederick to argue in his Extract of the work of Folard that the ancient world had 
produced no classic works on war, only to praise the Dutch reforms (which had been 
based on classical works) a few lines later.59 Reflecting the position of many 
contemporary intellectuals, Frederick in his non-military writings had praise both for 
the ancients and the moderns.60 In the later 1740s and the 1750s, however, Frederick 
sought to establish his oblique order of battle as a new tactical system superseding all 
previous ones, and in this context it was natural that Frederick should strongly 
associate himself with the military “moderns”.61 One enraptured contemporary 
declared that, “this [oblique] order is the most scientific, the most artful, the most 
perfect of all . . . The Prussian tactics form an era in military history.”62 Guichard 
similarly argued in his flattering 1774 Critical and Historical Memoirs on Several 
Points of Military Antiquities (which were dedicated to Frederick) that: 
 
The Romans . . . carried the art of war to the highest degree of perfection. 
But you, Sire, you have created a new tactic and through a great number 
of victorious battles you have at the same time furnished the most brilliant 
proof of its value.63  
 
Frederick’s Extract of the work of Folard specifically excluded the section in which 
the French thinker had set out his famous tactical system of column formations, and 
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Frederick’s introduction to the work argued that it was not necessary to consider the 
military science of earlier ages either. By implication, although Prussian officers were 
encouraged to adopt the offensive spirit of Folard and the French army, they should 
primarily follow the tactical system developed by, as Guichard put it, “this great king 
[Frederick], whose superior genius has given to the modern art of war that degree of 
consistency and perfection that it lacked, and which prevails in all respects over the 
practice of the ancients”.64 
 
 
4. A “Military Revolution” 
 
Alongside the political culture of ordered states and the new intellectual culture of 
“our age,” however, Frederick and his contemporaries also defined their own age in 
warfare in terms of changing technology and the tactics this fostered, although the 
precise timing of the decisive technological change was highly uncertain, just as 
contemporary intellectuals were vague about precisely when “our age” had begun.65 
The British colonel Campbell Dalrymple declared in 1761 that a “military revolution” 
had been inaugurated by the invention of gunpowder, and this was an argument made 
by commentators as far back as the 16th century.66 
Other military thinkers, however, stressed more recent technological change, 
particularly the introduction of the flintlock musket and socket bayonet at the turn of 
the 17th to the 18th century, which increased the musket’s rate of fire while making it 
no longer necessary to protect musketeers with separate units of pikemen. Instead, 
infantry was deployed in long lines to maximise firepower.67 Rohr portrayed change 
as evolutionary, noting “the gradually occurring alteration in weapons”: “before the 
firearm appeared, one deployed the troops much deeper, . . . In the days when pikes 
were used, one deployed a battalion differently than after their abolition. Before this 
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infantry and cavalry were deployed [mixed] among each other” and “fire worked 
differently”.68 Both Rohr and Puységur discussed the tactics of the imperial field 
marshal Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609-80), arguing that changes in weapons 
technology made Montecuccoli’s battle formations – based on cumbersome 
matchlock muskets and large numbers of pikemen – no longer appropriate.69 Writing 
in the 1720s, Quincy – another of Frederick’s favourite authors – noted that 
Montecuccoli and Turenne had intermingled infantry, cavalry and artillery in their 
order of battle, but that, “since all of Europe currently observes the usage of putting 
the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the flanks, one is obliged to conform to 
it”.70 In this case, substantial change had occurred within a single generation. 
The vast majority of the military authors read by Frederick, however, did not 
see this technological change as invalidating the relevance of classical military 
history. Feuquières and Quincy, firmly wedded to “the age of Louis XIV”, eschewed 
classical examples, but Folard famously made a specific study of Polybius, and 
frequently referred to ancient examples.71 Montecuccoli recognized a substantial 
difference in arms between his own time and the classical world – dating the change 
to “the invention of powder” – but argued that one could still draw tactical lessons 
from the ancients.72 Prior to entering Frederick’s service, Guichard said the same in 
his 1758 Military Memoirs on the Greeks and Romans.73 Maurice de Saxe proposed 
to equip contemporary troops with ancient weapons, and discussed the use of ancient 
tactics in his own day.74 Santa Cruz specifically stated his opposition to “the 
ridiculous opinion . . . that ancient histories are of very little use for the war of today”, 
                                                
68 Rohr, Versuche über die Kriegskunst, Vol. I, x. 
69 Puységur, Art de la guerre, Vol. I, 36; Rohr, Versuche über die Kriegskunst, Vol. II, xvi. 
70 Charles Sevin, marquis de Quincy, Histoire militaire du règne de Louis le Grand, roy de 
France, 7 vols. (Paris, 1726), Vol. VII_II, 56. On Frederick’s fondness for Quincy, see 
Hannelore Röhm and Sabine Scheidler, “Die Bibliotheken Friedrichs des Grossen”, in 
Friederisiko – Friedrich der Grosse. Die Ausstellung, ed. Generaldirektion der Stiftung 
Preußische Schlösser und Gärten Berlin Brandenburg (Munich, 2012), 324, 327. 
71 Extrait tiré des Commentaires du chevalier Folard, 6-9, 11-13, 119-21; Quimby, 
Background of Napoleonic Warfare, 27; Quincy, Histoire militaire, Vol. VII_II. For a rare 
reference to classical history in Feuquières’s work, see Feuquières, Mémoires, 30-1. 
72 Montecuccoli, Mémoires, 10-13, 24-5, 27-8, 191-2 (quotation, 11). 
73 Guichard, Mémoires militaires, Vol. I, 1. 
74 Maurice de Saxe, Les Rêveries, ou Mémoires sur l’art de la guerre, ed. Zacharie de Pazzi 
de Bonneville (The Hague, 1756), 29, 42-4, 82, 187-94. 
 17 
and illustrated his work using examples from the Bible and Greek and Roman history 
just as much as from wars of the gunpowder age and of his own day.75 
The rhetorical nature of some of these claims is highlighted, however, by the 
example of Puységur. On one hand, the French author presented ancient authorities to 
legitimate his own ideas and loudly claimed that ancient warfare remained relevant 
despite differences in technology. On the other hand, as we have seen, he claimed a 
few pages later that his work superseded that of Montecuccoli because changes in 
technology had made the latter’s ideas out-dated.76 Frederick’s own claims of a 
technological revolution in military affairs were similarly made for rhetorical 
purposes, as part of an attempt to restore his authority at a period of particular crisis. 
The most important technological change that Frederick confronted during his 
lifetime was the huge growth in the power of artillery in the mid 18th century, as 
advances in gun-founding made cannon barrels stronger, enabling both a higher rate 
of fire and the casting of lighter and thus more mobile guns, while the introduction of 
the elevating screw allowed cannon to be laid more quickly and accurately.77 
Frederick began the Seven Years War with a tactical system that was, as he put it, 
“founded on . . . the necessity of attack”.78 The greater power of artillery, however, 
combined with his enemies’ well-chosen defensive positions, took a terrible toll on 
the Prussian army as it took the offensive at battles like Prague and Kolin in 1757 and 
Kay and Kunersdorf in 1759, trying with mixed success to apply Frederick’s tactical 
system of the oblique order.79 In response to his setbacks, Frederick in the winters of 
1758 and 1759 wrote military treatises that were intended to serve as apologies to his 
generals for his rashness and as promises that he would in future respect the 
destructive power of firearms.80 
In these texts, Frederick claimed that there had been a fundamental change in 
warfare, but he did not consistently locate it at any one point in time or any one 
precise technology. Frederick’s claims were thus a rhetorical device, not a precise 
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historical analysis, but they were clearly a device that Frederick expected his generals 
to recognize and find convincing. In his Reflections on Certain Changes in the Way of 
Making War, finished on 27 December 1758, Frederick noted the effectiveness of 
Austrian defensive tactics in recent campaigns but argued that it was still possible to 
attack and defeat them. In this text, Frederick located change in the very recent past, 
recognizing that there had been considerable advances in firepower since the days of 
Feuquières, his favourite military author, whose aggressive strategic ideas reflected 
French practice from the early years of Louis XIV.81 In contrast, Frederick’s 
Reflections on the Character and Military Talents of Charles XII, King of Sweden 
were written in October and November 1759, after the terrible defeats at Kay and 
Kunersdorf, and in this text Frederick used criticism of Charles XII, whom he 
compared with himself, as a proxy for admitting his own mistakes.82 The Swedish 
king, however, who reigned from 1697 to 1718, belonged to the generation before the 
advent of the powerful new artillery. As a result, in order to argue that Charles (or 
rather Frederick himself) had failed to recognize the new developments in firepower, 
Frederick was obliged to date the change in warfare all the way back to “the invention 
of powder”.83 In his two texts, Frederick thus provided no clear story of military 
change, but instead used the idea of a revolutionary change in warfare as a means 
indirectly to acknowledge his own mistakes. 
Reflecting his master’s new approach, Guichard in 1774 emphasized “the 
prodigious effect of . . . firearms,” which now “prevailed” over “shock and the bladed 
weapon” [“l’arme blanche”].84 Having in 1758 emphasized the continued relevance of 
classical tactics, Guichard in 1774 argued that technological change at the turn of the 
18th century had made them outmoded, as the long thin lines of infantry inaugurated 
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by the flintlock musket and socket bayonet did “not at all resemble the tactic that 
Aelian, Arrian and Vegetius have shown to us”. While Guichard was obliged to spend 
some time justifying why, in this case, there was still value in studying ancient 
military history, his new argument had the advantage of disproving the work of 
Folard – Guichard’s main rival among 18th-century historians of ancient warfare – as 
Guichard now extolled the linear formations used by Frederick’s Prussian army as 
superior to the deep columns favoured by Folard.85 
In 1777, however, Frederick went back on his earlier claims, telling the 
Dowager Electress Maria Antonia of Saxony (1724-80) that, “although the invention 
or the discovery of powder totally changed the way of making war, there are 
nonetheless, in the tactics of the Greeks, things which merit our reflections and which 
may still serve as an example”. Frederick’s statement, ironically made as part of a 
letter that argued for the superiority of the moderns over the ancients, was a reminder 
that, although contemporaries genuinely felt that technological change had made their 
warfare different from previous ages, claims about the effects of technology on war 





While Frederick thus normally situated his battle tactics within “our age” and 
particularly in “the age of Louis XIV”, he made an exception when it came to his 
favourite ancient battle, Julius Caesar’s decisive victory over Pompey at Pharsalus in 
48 BC. In his introduction to Folard’s work, Frederick maintained that the only lesson 
to be learned from Caesar’s campaigns was the deployment of his cavalry at 
Pharsalus.87 In that campaign, seeking to offset his huge numerical disadvantage, with 
only 1,000 cavalry against Pompey’s 7,000, Caesar interspersed foot-soldiers among 
his horsemen: a technique learnt from the Germanic tribes. This allowed them to win 
successes in skirmishes against the Pompeians. In the battle itself, Caesar deployed 
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six detached cohorts of line infantry (perhaps 3,000 troops) behind his cavalry. When, 
despite being strengthened with foot soldiers, his horsemen were routed by the 
overwhelming numbers of their opponents, these six cohorts in turn attacked and 
routed the Pompeian cavalry, then fell on the left flank and rear of Pompey’s infantry, 
playing the crucial role in achieving victory.88 Pharsalus thus offered an example of 
how infantry support could enable cavalry to overcome superior numbers of 
opponents. 
Notably, Frederick himself interspersed infantry units among his cavalry at his 
first battle – at Mollwitz on 10 April 1741 – where, just like Caesar, he faced an 
Austrian army whose cavalry were much more numerous than his own. His battle 
plan specified that grenadier battalions should accompany both cavalry wings and that 
the cavalry should maintain the same pace as them while attacking.89 Indeed, he had 
written to Field Marshal Kurt Christoph von Schwerin the month before the battle, 
proposing that, since “the enemy relies very much on their cavalry, . . . our cavalry 
should have infantry interspersed among them in the order of battle”.90 Frederick’s 
innovation was disastrously unsuccessful, however, as the Austrian cavalry routed the 
stationary Prussian horsemen and swept the king along with them.91 
Frederick claimed in the 1775 version of his History of My Times that his 
tactics at Mollwitz followed the example of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden 
(reigned 1611-32) at the battle of Lützen in 1632.92 The Theatri Europaei, a chronicle 
of European history that Frederick studied as a child, did indeed describe Gustavus 
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interspersing musketeers among his cavalry both at the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 
and at Lützen, but the tactic did not have a decisive impact on the result of either 
battle.93 Certainly, Frederick’s literary associates flatteringly compared him with 
Gustavus Adolphus, and indeed Frederick’s History of Brandenburg portrayed the 
Swedish king as a great man very much like the Prussian one: an exponent of military 
strength, unscrupulous and seeking personal glory, but in the process liberating 
Germany from Habsburg domination.94 Frederick’s history, however, did not describe 
Gustavus’s battle tactics at all. For Breitenfeld, Frederick merely said that “Gustavus 
Adolphus . . . falls upon the imperials, whom he defeats totally”.95 He did not describe 
Gustavus’s later campaigns in southern Germany, and on Lützen he said only, “the 
King of Sweden . . . arrives, he wins the famous battle of Lützen, and loses his life 
fighting”.96 Moreover, the name of Gustavus appears only once in the three published 
volumes of Frederick’s military writings, in a treatise written in 1781 near the end of 
his life. Even then Frederick did not go into details, merely listing the Swedish king’s 
campaigns among other historical examples from which his officers could learn.97 
This was in total contrast to the king’s repeated and detailed descriptions of battles 
from the wars of Louis XIV. In this context, the Prussian king’s 1775 claim to have 
followed Gustavus’s tactics, something he had not mentioned in the original 1746 
version of his memoirs, seems like a belated attempt to excuse his youthful mistake 
by invoking the example of the great Swedish general.98 While Frederick undoubtedly 
compared himself to Gustavus on the political level, the Swedish king’s influence on 
Frederick’s battle tactics must remain unproven. 
In contrast, Frederick’s writings described in detail Caesar’s campaign against 
Pompey in Greece in 48 BC and also showed a good understanding of the siege of 
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Marseille in 49 BC, reflecting Frederick’s particular interest in Caesar’s 
Commentaries.99 It is well known that Frederick was inspired by Caesar, saw his 
invasion of the Austrian province of Silesia in 1740 as comparable with Caesar’s 
destruction of the Roman Republic, and was particularly fascinated by the battle of 
Pharsalus.100 When Frederick in 1740 presented himself to French statesmen as 
another Gustavus Adolphus, ready to fight for French interests in Germany, this was a 
political move to present himself as a potential French ally, not a genuine reflection of 
Frederick’s feelings.101 In contrast, Frederick’s private letters to close associates such 
as Francesco Algarotti and Charles-Étienne Jordan were full of excited comparisons 
of himself with Caesar, both during the planning of the invasion of Silesia and its 
execution.102 He famously told his foreign minister Heinrich von Podewils that he was 
“cross[ing] the Rubicon” when he invaded the province, and he celebrated his victory 
in the First Silesian War (1740-2) with a performance of Carl Heinrich Graun’s opera 
Caesar and Cleopatra.103 To flatter his monarchical patron, Algarotti compared 
Frederick repeatedly to Caesar during the First Silesian War, declaring in February 
1742 that, “Your Majesty is going to make perhaps the most important march that has 
been made since Pharsalus and Philippi [site of the defeat of Caesar’s assassins Brutus 
and Cassius in 42 BC]”.104 Voltaire flatteringly compared both Mollwitz and the 
conquest of Silesia to Caesar’s achievement at Pharsalus, while Frederick himself 
grandiloquently declared that, “since the war of Pharsalus, there were never greater 
interests discussed than in the present war”.105 While it is impossible to prove beyond 
doubt exactly what inspired Frederick to intersperse grenadiers among his cavalry, it 
seems highly likely that he hoped to make Mollwitz his own personal battle of 
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Pharsalus, where he would offset the superior Austrian cavalry by interspersing 
infantry among his horsemen. 
While Frederick after Mollwitz never again interspersed foot-soldiers among 
his cavalry, the years of peace between the Second Silesian War (1744-5) and the 
Seven Years War saw the Prussian king still attempt to emulate Caesar’s tactic of 
using a detached infantry force on his flank to defeat enemy cavalry and then outflank 
their infantry. Twice in his 1748 General Principles, and again once in his 1755 
Thoughts and General Rules, Frederick sketched out battle plans in which the cavalry 
on the Prussian flanks would be supported by infantry, which might aid it in defeating 
the enemy cavalry and, once these had fled, would fall on the flank of the enemy 
infantry while the rest of the Prussian army attacked them in front.106 In one case, 
Frederick specifically described this as an example of his trademark “oblique order of 
battle”, and indeed he proposed to win with his right flank, just as Caesar had done at 
Pharsalus.107 In another scenario, Frederick proposed also to distribute dragoons 
among the second line of infantry, seeking to recreate his own success at the battle of 
Hohenfriedberg (4 June 1745), where the Bayreuth Dragoon Regiment had routed the 
Austrians by exploiting a gap in their infantry line.108 Thus, although Frederick did 
not actually employ such tactics in the Seven Years War, his writings repeatedly set 
out plans for emulating Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus, and sought to combine it with 
the emulation of Frederick’s own greatest victory to date. 
 
 
6. “The Conqueror” 
 
Frederick’s desire to emulate Caesar reflected his broader use of classical history as 
inspiration for the bold strategies he favoured. While the Prussian king generally 
stayed tactically rooted in the “age of Louis XIV”, he found numerous examples from 
classical history to inspire his strategic ideas. In contrast to his almost total silence on 
the battle tactics of the Second Punic War, Frederick loved to describe again and 
again the bold strategy of Scipio Africanus in 204-202 BC, who, “From the Tiber 
desolated by the demon of war / Carries to the regions of the guilty land / Carnage and 
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horror”, and to tell “by what blow Scipio saved Rome in Africa / Attracting Hannibal 
to frightened Carthage”.109 He similarly praised the boldness of Hannibal in crossing 
the Alps in 218 BC to carry the war into Italy.110 Whereas Frederick made no mention 
of Hannibal’s tactics of envelopment at the famous battle of Cannae in 216 BC, he 
repeatedly discussed the strategic implications of the battle, praising the determination 
of the Romans in continuing the war despite their defeats, and criticising Hannibal’s 
failure to exploit his victory by capturing Rome.111 
Frederick’s interest in classical warfare at the strategic level reflected an 
idealised conception of an ancient world freed from the limitations of his own age. In 
his Thoughts and General Rules, Frederick lamented that “as, in all our wars, Europe 
is divided into two great factions, a certain balance of forces results, which means 
that, after many successes, one has scarcely advanced when the general peace is 
made”.112 In contrast, Frederick and Electress Maria Antonia of Saxony in 1777 
sketched out an image of the ancient world as much simpler. “I see many great men 
doing impressive things there”, commented the electress, “but in a very narrow circle, 
having only few obstacles to overcome, not knowing the multiplicity or the 
complication of our modern interests”.113 Frederick agreed: “[contemporary] 
European politics is infinitely more complicated than that of the Greeks; the machine 
is more vast and the springs more complicated”. He argued that this reflected the 
alliance systems that had developed “since the age of [Holy Roman Emperor] Charles 
V [reigned 1519-56]”, and the appearance since then of “prodigious armies”.114 
Frederick and many of his contemporaries argued that expansive conquests 
had been much easier for those who were not limited by the conditions of 
contemporary warfare. This included not just figures from the ancient world but also 
generals such as Charles XII who campaigned outside of “policed land[s]”. In his 
Refutation of Machiavelli, Frederick argued that: 
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Alexander, Caesar, Charles XII owed their glory to the fact that they 
found few fortresses in the countries they conquered . . . Eugene, Villars, 
Marlborough, Luxembourg were quite different captains from Charles and 
Alexander, but fortresses in a certain way blunted the brilliance of their 
successes, which, when one judges them soundly, are preferable to those 
of Alexander and Charles.115 
 
Military commentators had made similar arguments about the impact of 
fortresses since the 16th century.116 The great French engineer Sébastien Le 
Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707) – whose work was published in 1739-42 and 
dedicated to Frederick – for instance noted that, because of the numerous 
fortresses there, “a battle in the Low Countries usually has few consequences” 
and “one has often seen conquerors halted in the middle of their course”.  
 
It took much less time and effort to render oneself master of all of Asia 
than it took to conquer only part of the Low Countries . . . In these vast 
countries where there are none or very few fortified places, the victorious 
pursue the defeated army until it is entirely dispersed. This is normally 
followed by the sack of the provinces which find themselves thereby 
forced to accept the law of the conqueror. This is precisely what 
Alexander did, rendering himself master of the redoubtable monarchy of 
the Persians by means of three battles, and one sees the same thing with 
Caesar . . . or Tamerlane, the famous conqueror of Asia.117 
 
Santa Cruz, who scarcely distinguished between different periods of history, 
maintained that Gustavus Adolphus still considered it possible to emulate “ancient 
conquerors”, despite the advent of firearms and the new fortresses.118 However, he 
also described Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736) complaining that Alexander 
would never have made such great conquests if he had had to get permission from the 
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Dutch deputies before undertaking anything.119 Thus, even Santa Cruz to an extent 
followed romanticised ideas that, in the ancient world, and in other lands outside of 
contemporary western Europe, it had been much easier to conquer large areas through 
decisive battles.120 
Ideas of imitating ancient conquerors shaped Frederick’s strategy from his 
earliest days. Frederick’s 1731 letter to his chamberlain Dubislav Gneomar von 
Natzmer setting out future targets for Prussian expansion was a naive document, 
written only at the beginning of Frederick’s period of intensive reading during the 
1730s.121 Frederick, however, already imagined how “I advance always from country 
to country, from conquest to conquest, proposing for myself, like Alexander, always 
new worlds to conquer”.122 Whereas, as noted above, Frederick never discussed 
Alexander’s battle tactics in his writings, the Macedonian king was already well 
established in Frederick’s mind as an example of a conqueror of vast territories. 
Frederick’s attempt to emulate classical conquerors was seen most strikingly 
at the beginning of the Seven Years War. Writing to Algarotti in December 1756 and 
referring to the limited campaign by which he had occupied Saxony that year at the 
start of the war, Frederick said: 
 
Everything we have done this year [in Saxony] is only a weak prelude to 
what you will learn next year. We started a little too late to be able to 
undertake a lot. But, whatever we do, . . . we are not living in the age of 
the Caesars. All that one can do at present is, I believe, to reach the 
highest point of mediocrity. The limits of the age do not extend further . . . 
P.S. The trifles that have happened this year are just a prelude to the next, 
and we have not done anything yet if we do not imitate Caesar on the day 
of Pharsalus.123 
 
Writing to his sister Anna Amalia in March 1757, just before the opening of the new 
campaign, Frederick was even more explicit: 
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This next campaign is like that of Pharsalus for the Romans, or that of 
Leuctra for the Greeks, or that of Denain [in 1712] for the French, or like 
the siege of Vienna [in 1683] for the Austrians. These are the epochs that 
decide everything, and which change the face of Europe.124 
 
When a major battle was fought at Prague on 6 May 1757, both Frederick and (in 
flattering response) Algarotti compared it to Pharsalus. Frederick concluded his 
detailed description of the battle by claiming that, “the king will find himself . . . , in 
less than a month, having conquered a kingdom [Bohemia]”.125 In Frederick’s 
strategic thinking, therefore, Pharsalus was an example of a decisive battle leading to 
the conquest of “a kingdom”: an achievement of the kind that was possible in 




King Frederick II’s account of military history reveals the sharp distinctions that he 
and his contemporaries made between their own time and previous ages. On one 
hand, stronger government now imposed order to prevent destructive religious and 
civil wars. On the other hand, intellectual developments (most notably the “new 
philosophy”, the so-called “Scientific Revolution”) were seen as making “our age” 
more advanced than any that had come before. Frederick’s portrayal of military 
history is a reminder that the narrative of intellectual progress existed alongside a 
narrative of states bringing order, and that monarchs like Louis XIV of France and 
Frederick II of Prussia presented themselves as exemplifying both developments. Not 
only did the Prussian army epitomise the disciplined soldiers expected of “policed 
nations”, but Frederick situated his battle tactics – particularly his trademark “oblique 
order of battle” – firmly in “our age”, and particularly in “the age of Louis XIV”.  
The classical world was an important inspiration for attempts to impose order, 
particularly in the military sphere, but intellectually the distinction between “our age” 
and previous ages made the ancient past into a deeply foreign world. This foreignness, 
however, also made ancient history an attractive alternative to the constraints of the 
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present day and, at the strategic level, Frederick turned to an idealised classical world 
in order to envisage conquests that went beyond what was possible within his own 
states system. He particularly admired Julius Caesar, and sought again and again to 
win his own personal battle of Pharsalus. Just as, in the later 18th century, the 
philhellene Johann Joachim Winckelmann imagined an idealized and a-historic 
ancient Greece to support his democratic ideas, so the monarchical warlord Frederick 
earlier in the century yearned for an age where classical conquerors could occupy 
whole states through decisive battles, unfettered by the limits of the European balance 
of power. 
The example of Frederick also shows that ideas of change in military affairs 
are driven not just by actual change (for instance in technology or state structures) but 
also by how soldiers and military writers perceive the relationship between the 
military methods of their own time and those of previous ages. Moreover, military 
figures may choose to manipulate such perceptions for their own purposes.126 
Frederick does seem to have had a largely consistent view of military history, which 
substantially influenced his own military thought. Espousing the claims of “moderns” 
that “our age” was far superior to the ancients was, however, also a convenient means 
by which the Prussian king could portray his own tactical system as surpassing 
everything that had gone before. Similarly, while Frederick and the military authors 
he read did recognise genuine developments in military technology in early modern 
Europe, there was just as much dispute among contemporaries as there is among 
modern historians over the timing of this change and the degree to which it had made 
the methods of the classical world out of date. In such circumstances, ancient history 
could be readily appropriated or rejected to suit a given rhetorical purpose, and 
Frederick used ideas of fundamental changes in warfare primarily as a coded apology 
for his own mistakes as a general. The rhetoric of military change could be as 
important as the reality, and Frederick played on concepts of different ages of warfare 
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